1 In any event, since the nondual realization of the ultimate identity between the self and the divine (and/or the Kosmos) is the explicit goal of certain Eastern schools (e.g., Advaita Vedanta), it is understandable that scholars find an Eastern bias in Wilber's scheme. 2 As for Rowan's second statement, though both Underhill (1955) and Wilber (1995 Wilber ( , 2006 offer universal maps of spiritual development -a highly discredited notion in contemporary scholarship -their final stages are far from equivalent. Wilber erroneously equates Underhill's 'divine mysticism' with his own 'states of nondual union'. Underhill's 'unitive life,' however, is characterized not by the nondual realization of one's deepest self as the divine, but by a process of 'deification' (theosis) resulting from the ongoing 'spiritual marriage' between God and the soul. In Christian mysticism, even for Pseudo-Dionysius, deification or 'being as much as possible like and in union with God' (McGinn & McGinn, 2003, p.186 ) is a gift bestowed by 1 See Stoeber (1994) for a contemporary argument of the superiority of theistic dual states over monistic nondual ones. Similarly, Buber (1961) regarded the I/Thou relationship with God as spiritually higher than the monistic experience of nonduality, and Zaehner (1957) argued that the monistic ideal is transcended in theistic mysticism, considering Sankara's monistic liberation (moksa) a primitive stage in the process of deification. More recently, Wilber's (1995) ranking of nondual mysticism over theism and other contemplative paths has been critiqued and rebutted by Helminiak (1998, pp.213-92) , Adams (2002) , and, perhaps most effectively, by Schlamm (2001) , who uses Rawlinson's (1997 Rawlinson's ( , 2000 typology of mystical orientations to show the arbitrariness and doctrinal nature of such rankings. 2 Both Wilber's account of nondual realization -built upon monistic belief in the ultimate identity between one's true Self and the divine -and his stage model draw heavily from the writings of Franklin Jones (aka Adi Da), a Western adept of Hinduism (see Daniels, B., 2005) . Elsewhere, I argue for the importance of distinguishing between different forms of nonduality usually conflated by Wilber; for example, the Hindu Atman-Brahman nonduality and the Buddhist nonduality of emptiness (sunyata) are conceptually, experientially, and ontologically distinct (Ferrer, 2002; cf. Fenton, 1995) . Considering the Soto Zen founder Dogen's nonduality, Harmless (2008) writes that though 'he pointed to the radically nondual, it cannot be presumed he is speaking of a oneness within ultimate reality that is anything like what Christians or Muslism speak of, much less what Hindus mean when they speak of a deeper monism ' (p.253) .
God based on the soul's participation in (vs. identity with) divine nature that should not be mistaken with monistic nondual claims (McGinn & McGinn, 2003) . In fact, Underhill explicitly rejects monistic interpretations holding that 'extreme mystics preach the annihilation of the self and regard themselves as co-equal with the Deity' (Underhill, 1955, p.419) and insists that 'the great mystics are anxious above all things to establish and force on us the truth that by deification they intend no arrogant claim to identification with God ' (Ibid. p.420) . 3 Even if a marginal number of Christian mystics might have reported states of nondual union with God -a view that Underhill did not support -those are arguably different from Wilber's nonduality. 4 Further, not only nonduality but also mystical union fails to typify the dominant trends of the Christian mystical tradition, which are more adequately described as cultivating the 'direct presence of God, ' as McGinn (1994a, p.xvii) stated in the introduction to his authoritative multivolume history of Western Christian mysticism. Even if one cites the work of Marion (2000) or other modern Christian authors influenced by Wilber's model, doing so does not change two thousand years of documented history. In any event, since a variety of nondual states have been reported across traditions, I suggest that instead of an 'Eastern bias,' it may be more accurate to talk about a 'monistic nondual bias' in Wilber's approach (see also Ferrer, 2002, pp.89-90) . 3 This type of move -unfortunately frequent in Wilber's work -partly explains why Wilber is mostly ignored in the field of religious studies. Although Wilber cannot be unaware that Underhill's 'unitive life' has nothing to do with his own 'nondual realization,' he nonetheless equates them to defend the universal validity of his model. Even if Underhill's map would fit Wilber's, her overall characterization of Christian mysticism in terms of 'mystical union' is today recognized as a historical distortion (Harmless, 2008, pp.251-253; McGinn, 1994a) . Historically, the Christian mystical path had many goals (e.g., spiritual marriage, the birth of the Word in the soul, the vision of God, deification, unio mystica, the direct feeling of the presence of God, etc.), but Wilber's nonduality was not one of them. For instance, St. Bonaventure, one of the greatest cartographers of the Christian path, depicts the final spiritual stage as an ecstatic union with the salvific suffering of Christ: 'For Bonaventure, union meant sharing in the radical self-emptying, self-abnegating union with Christ crucified' (Harmless, 2008, p.252) . For discussions of the varieties of mystical union between the soul and God in the Semitic traditions, see Idel and McGinn (1996) and McGinn (2005) . 4 For a nuanced account of the differences between Eastern and Christian nondualities, see Barnhart (2001) . Whereas in the East nonduality (whether of self and God, or self and world) is taken to be the ontologically given nature of things, to be realized by the mystic, when and if insinuated in the West, nonduality becomes a new historical ontological reality that did not exist before. In Christianity, mystical union with God was generally conceived in this same spirit. Commenting on Jan van Ruuesbroec's mysticism, for example, Dupré (1996) writes: 'By its dynamic quality, the mystical experience surpasses the mere awareness of an already present, ontological union. Rowan proceeds with a three-part defense of Wilber's work against my participatory critique (Ferrer, 2002) . First, he claims to be responding to my challenge of the perennialist idea that mystics are 'all saying the same thing' (Rowan et al., 2009, p.10) , and without providing supporting evidence, states that 'it turns out the more precisely the [mystical] experiences are described, the more similar they seem to be' (Ibid. p.10). 5 Without further explanation, he adds that Wilber's version of the perennial philosophy is more sophisticated than the one I critiqued.
However, among the varieties of perennialism discussed in my work -basic, esotericist, perspectival, typological, and structuralist -only the basic type holds that mystics are 'all saying the same thing' (Ferrer, 2000b (Ferrer, , 2002 . I know of nobody today, including Wilber, who holds this view, so I am puzzled as to why Rowan brings it up in this context. As for Rowan's additional claim, contemporary scholarship reveals exactly the opposite picture: The more precisely mystical states are described, the more disparate they appear to be, such that features that may have initially appeared similar turn out, on closer inspection, to represent significant divergences. As Mommaers and van Bragt (1995) point out, 'the mystics themselves would be the last ones to concede a single, common essence in mystical awareness ' (p.45) . The supporting literature is too voluminous to cite here, but the reader can consult Hollenback's (1996) meticulous work, which shows the striking differences between the mystical states and understandings of Western, Eastern, and indigenous figures. I am mindful that Wilber's model can explain these and other differences by appealing to his four mysticism types (psychic, subtle, causal, nondual), their enaction from the perspective of different structures of consciousness (archaic, magic, mythic, rational, pluralistic, integral, and super-integral) , and the interpretive impact of each tradition's language and doctrines. I will return to this below, but let us first look at Rowan's second point.
Second, Rowan misconstrues my critique of experientialism -targeted at a subtly dualistic and individualist account of spirituality arguably associated with spiritual narcissism and integrative arrestment (Ferrer, 2000a (Ferrer, , 2002 ) -as suggesting the altogether different point that mystics are conformists. In any event, Rowan champions the view that the great mystics are 5 Unless indicated otherwise, all mention of Rowan, Daniels, and Fontana in this article refers to Rowan, Daniels, Fontana, and Walley (2009). spiritual revolutionaries, mentioning (as usual in these cases) Meister Eckhart as paradigmatic.
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Unfortunately, Eckhart is so well known precisely because of his rather exceptional break with tradition and famous Inquisition trial (McGinn, 2001) . 7 In other words, heretic mystics are actually the exception to the rule, and most mystics adhere to received doctrines and scriptures (see, e.g., Katz, 1983a Katz, , 1983b Katz, , 2000 . As Harmless (2008) (Ferrer, 2002, pp.140-144) and presents participatory spirituality as emerging from the interaction among human multidimensional cognition, historical-cultural background, and the generative power of life, the cosmos, and/or the mystery. Furthermore, whereas past mysticism may be largely conservative, participatory approaches (contra Rowan's depiction) invite us to undertake not only the revision of traditional religious forms, but also the cocreation of novel spiritual understandings, practices, and even expanded states of freedom.
Third, Rowan claims that my critique does not apply to Wilber's current views and that, as I indicated in Revisioning Transpersonal Theory (Ferrer, 2002) , the majority of transpersonal writers 'still do adhere to a more sophisticated view of the perennial philosophy' (Rowan et al., 6 Wilber's (1995) and Marion's (2000) use of Eckhart as representing a nondual mysticism parallel to Ramana Maharshi's is distorting. In contrast to Ramana's absolute monism, Eckhart's account of the mystical union with God maintains the formal duality between the soul and the divine: 'Eckhart's notion of indistinct union … is fundamentally dialectical, that is to say, union with God is indistinct in the ground, but we always maintain a distinction from God in our formal being … Even in the ultimate union in heaven, Eckhart insists, this distinction will remain ' (McGinn, 2001, p.148) . See also Harmless (2008, pp.125-132) . As Schlamm (2001) points out, Wilber's treatment of St. Teresa is equally problematic: 'What Wilber has done is to superimpose his developmental model on to Teresa's journey … and has thereby distorted both the texture and the content of her spiritual testimony' (p.30). 7 Though Eckhart developed a new terminology with his language of 'the ground' (grunt), the revolutionary nature of his mysticism tends to be exaggerated in popular circles. Eckhart's metaphysics of emanation and return has a long pedigree in the Christian tradition (e.g., Origen, Pseudo-Dionysius, Bonaventure), his articulation of an indistinct union with God was inspired by the Beguine mystics (especially Marguerite Porete), and his teaching on the unceasing birth of God in the soul goes back to Origen (as Eckhart acknowledges in one of his sermons) (Harmless, 2008; McGinn, 1994b McGinn, , 2001 ). 8 This is not to say that there were not heretical mystics who challenged traditional authority (Cupitt, 1998; Kripal, 2006) , but simply that, in light of the available historical evidence, those were rather the exception to the rule. Ferrer (1998a Ferrer ( , 1998b Ferrer ( , 2000a Ferrer ( , 2000b Ferrer ( , 2001 . 10 The Christian theologian Vroom (1996) gets to the heart of this problem: 'If a Zen master states that faith in God is only halfway down the road to ultimate wisdom because the idea of a separate being, distinguished from the world in which we live, is naive and betrays attachment to the self, then I see no philosophical ground for concluding that Zen and Christianity refer to the same divine or "empty" transcendence' (p.148). 11 Since Wilber's nonduality is admittedly different than traditional versions, even nondual practitioners may need to strike this bargain in order to qualify as 'proper' suitors of his final realization.
Though different traditions obviously focus on the enacting of particular mystical states and goals (#4 above), I strongly dispute the plausibility and legitimacy of Wilber's hierarchical rankings (#1-3 above).
Because the participatory approach has been pigeon-holed as relativist and self-contradictory (Wilber, 2002) (Ferrer, 2002 (Ferrer, , 2008a (Ferrer, , 2008b (Ferrer, , 2010 . Since it is likely that most religious traditions would not rank too highly in the dissociation test (see Ferrer, 2008a) , it should be obvious that the participatory approach also leads to a strong ranking of spiritual orientations.
The crucial difference is that the participatory rankings are not ideologically based on a priori ontological doctrines or putative correspondence to a single nondual Spiritual Reality, but instead ground critical discernment in the practical values of selflessness, embodiment, and integration. I stand by these values, not because I think they are 'universal' (they are not), but because I firmly believe that their cultivation can effectively reduce personal, relational, social, and planetary suffering. To be sure, this distinction can be problematized since the specificities of the various spiritual transformational goals often derive from ontological views about the nature of reality or the divine. As I elaborate below, however, the participatory ranking is not itself precipitated by the privileging of a single spiritual goal, but rather explodes into a plurality of potentially holistic spiritual realizations that can take place within and outside traditions.
Furthermore, most traditions are today reconstructing themselves in precisely these embodied and holistic directions.
To summarize, even after Wilber's ad hoc modifications, his model still privileges nondual, monistic, and formless spiritualities over theistic and visionary ones, 12 even as it seeks to confine the multiplicity of spiritual expressions to a single, unilinear sequence of spiritual development.
Insofar as Wilber's model retains this sequence and associated doctrinal rankings of spiritual states, stages, and traditions, the essence of the participatory critique is both applicable and effective. However, although I consider the critique justifiable, I do not think of it as a definitive refutation of Wilber's model (though its claimed universality is refutable by evidence). My sense is that both the participatory and Wilberian visions can accommodate spiritual diversity in different ways. In the same way that alternative and even logically incompatible theories can fit all possible evidence-as the Duhem-Quine principle of 'underdetermination of theory by evidence, shows (Duhem, 1953; Quine, 1953) -it is likely that these alternative, integral metatheories can fit all possible spiritual data. In contrast to Wilber's theory, however, I submit that participatory integralism meets this challenge (a) without distorting traditions' selfunderstanding; 13 (b) by engendering more harmonious inter-religious relations (Ferrer, 2010) ; and (c) by emancipating individual spiritual inquiry and growth from the constraints of an evolutionarily laid-down, pregiven sequence of transpersonal stages (Ferrer, 2002; Heron, 1998) .
In addition, I contend that the participatory approach is more aligned with the seemingly inexhaustible creativity of the mystery and more parsimonious in its accounting for the same spiritual evidence. Notably, it is unclear whether the ever-increasing conceptual proliferation of Wilber's integral theory is truly necessary, or whether it may suggest the exhaustion of the model's explanatory effectiveness and the possible degeneration of his research program.
12 As feminist analyses suggest, these rankings also might reveal a patriarchal bias. For the patriarchal roots of the historical denigration of visionary forms of mysticism, see Hollywood (2002) and Jantzen (1995) , and for a suggestion that the common association between monism and mysticism may be a product of the male psyche, see Jantzen (1990) . 13 Given its normative challenge to traditions, it can be reasonably said that the participatory approach does not fully honor some traditions' self-understanding. True enough. On the one hand, however, it can be argued that the world traditions themselves -from Christianity to Yoga, Tantra to Buddhism to Taoism -are nowadays reconstructing themselves precisely in more holistic and embodied directions, and that the participatory call can be seen as giving voice to and strengthening a pre-existing trend within most traditions. On the other hand, and perhaps more crucially, the participatory approach does not require traditions to sacrifice their doctrinal integrity and embrace others' spiritual ultimate because it holds that all traditions can potentially become more embodied and holistic in their own terms. As I elaborate below, if Shamkya Yoga -arguably one of the most explicitly dissociative spiritual traditions of all -can be conceptually and practically reconstructed in embodied and integrative ways (see Whicher, 1999) , others can do the same. Whether this outcome may ultimately be possible or not, I firmly believe in the value of approaching this dialogue open to such possibilities.
Kosmic Habits: Cultural or universal?
It should come as no surprise to readers familiar with my work that I concur with virtually everything Daniels says in the dialogue (e.g., about the ideological nature of Wilber's map; its distortion of the God of the Semitic traditions, etc.). Since Daniels's perspective is so germane to mine, I will not spend time re-affirming our many areas of convergence and instead focus my efforts on clarifying my view of participatory cocreation and reflecting on the related question of the cultural versus universal nature of Wilber's Kosmic habits.
As a preliminary aside, I was relieved to finally see in print what has been in the mind of so many in transpersonal and integral circles for years: Wilber-5 is, in part, a 'participatory revision of Wilber-4.' 14 As Daniels notes, the cocreated nature of the spiritual path, the language of participation, and the use of the myth of the given in spiritual critical discourse are central features of the participatory approach introduced in my early work (Ferrer, 2000a (Ferrer, , 2000b (Ferrer, , 2001 (Ferrer, , 2002 . This participatory reform is startling, especially given Wilber's (2002) dismissive account of Revisioning Transpersonal Theory as expressing 'a green-meme approach to spirituality, a kind of participatory samsara equated with nirvana.' 15 As Daniels points out, Wilber often displays the disturbing scholarly habit of incorporating into his theorizing critical points made by others about his work -at times points he previously dismissed as misinformed or conveying less evolved levels of spiritual discernment -and presenting them as autonomous developments of his thinking. In this case, Wilber has assimilated aspects of the participatory approach into his integral vision; from a participatory perspective, however, many problems remain.
Daniels writes that, whereas in my view the different 'cocreated [spiritual] realities are cultural constructions' (Rowan et al., 2009, p.21) , for Wilber 'these cocreated structures … become parts of the Kosmos … ontological realities that everybody has to negotiate' (Ibid. p.21).
Stated this way, however, Daniels's account might mislead readers to associate the participatory approach with cultural constructivism, which I explicitly critique as operating under the spell of 14 As described by one member of the Integral Institute, requesting anonymity (personal communication, May 16, 2008) . 15 I decided not to respond to Wilber's (2002) critique because each of his substantial points had already been anticipated and addressed in Revisioning Transpersonal Theory (e.g., the 'green meme' critique or the charge of performative self-contradiction) (see also Ferrer, in preparation-a) .
what Popper (1994) calls the 'myth of the framework' (Ferrer, 2002, p.141) . In the present context, this myth suggests that mystics and religious practitioners are prisoners of their cultures and conceptual frameworks, and that spiritual knowledge must always be shaped by or screened through such frameworks. In contrast, participatory approaches conceive mystical phenomena as cocreated events emerging not only from culture, but also from the interaction of human multidimensional cognition and a nondetermined mystery or creative power of life, the cosmos, and/or spirit (Ferrer, 2002; Ferrer, 2008a; Ferrer & Sherman, 2008a , 2008b . In other words, participatory spirituality embraces the role of language and culture in religious phenomena while simultaneously recognizing the importance, and at times the centrality, of nonlinguistic (somatic, energetic, imaginal, archetypal, etc.) and transcultural factors (the creative power of life and/or the spirit) in shaping religious experiences. As we put it in the introduction to The Participatory
Turn:
The adoption of an enactive paradigm of cognition in the study of religion, however, frees us from the myth of the framework … by holding that human multidimensional cognition cocreatively participates in the emergence of a number of plausible enactions of reality. Participatory enaction, in other words, is epistemologically constructivist and metaphysically realist. (Ferrer & Sherman, 2008b, p.35) As Gleig and Boeving (2009) write in their essay review of the book: 'Ontological veracity … is not inherently at odds with a contextualist sensibility. To acknowledge that humans do not only discover but also shape and co-create spiritual landscapes does not annul the metaphysical reality of such mystical worlds' (p.66).
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I suspect that the source of Daniels's apparent misapprehension of my view may be largely semantic. In particular, I wonder whether it emerges from the implicit equation of 'Kosmic' (or 'ontological') with 'universal' in the dialogue. After all, Daniels writes:
16 Although a philosophical divide is often traced between 'representationalist realists' and 'antirepresentationalist constructivists' who tend to reject realism (e.g., Rorty, 2004) , this generally valid polarization becomes fallacious if taken to be normative. As Engler (2004) shows in an instructive essay, constructivism -though challenging the correspondence between linguistic signs and independent facts -is not necessarily antirealist or relativistic. For a recent, sophisticated 'realist-constructivist synthesis' in international relations theory, see Barkin (2010) . More attuned to participatory standpoints, Minner (2004) offers an account of knowledge as 'true construction' that takes human creative pursuits to be participating in divine knowledge and creation.
I don't deny that groups of people can cocreate … morphogenetic fields -or habits of working, or patterns of working … What I am denying is that they become Kosmic habits -that they become realities that are given in the Kosmos, and are fixed, and everyone has to go through them. (Rowan et al., 2009, p wants to confine such ontological multiplicity to his unilinear evolutionary sequence, but I believe it is both more accurate and more generous to envision cosmic and spiritual evolution as branching out in many different but potentially intermingled directions (or as an omnicentered rhizome propagating through offshoots and thickenings of its nodes; Deleuze & Guattari, 1987 ).
If we accept this view, we can affirm the ontological nature of a plurality of Kosmic habits free from Wilberian dogmatic constraints.
There may also be deeper philosophical issues behind Daniels's reluctance to grant an ontological status to Wilber's Kosmic habits. Following Jung, Daniels (2001) proposes that transpersonal psychology should remain metaphysically agnostic toward any ontological reality beyond the physical and psychological (cf. Friedman, 2002) and should focus on the phenomenological study of human experience. This apparently prudent stance, however, is rooted in an implicit allegiance to neo-Kantian frameworks that either bracket or deny the existence of supernatural and metaphysical realities. At its heart rests the Kantian belief that innate or deeply seated epistemic constraints in human cognition render impossible or illicit any knowledge claim about such metaphysical realities. In other words, metaphysical realities may exist, but the only thing we can access is our situated phenomenal awareness of them. The legitimacy of metaphysical agnosticism is thus contingent on the validity of a neo-Kantian dualistic metaphysics, which, although not necessarily wrong (based on its metaphysical status, that is), nonetheless undermines the professed neutrality of metaphysical agnosticism (cf. King, 1999, pp.169-186; Lancaster, 2002) . Indeed, as Northcote (2004) persuasively argues, the methodological suspension of the validity of supernormal claims (e.g., about metaphysical entities or levels of reality), far from warranting objectivism or scholarly neutrality in the study of religion, may actually constitute a bias against 'the possibility that people's thinking and behaviour are indeed based on various supernormal forces … a bracketing approach will falsely attribute mundane sociological explanations to behaviour that is in actuality shaped by supernatural forces' (p.89). Accordingly, Northcote issues a call for dialogue between Western naturalist and alternative perspectives in the appraisal of supernormal claims.
The point here is that unless one subscribes ideologically to a naturalistic metaphysics, 17 it may be prudent -and heuristically fertile -not to reject a priori the possibility of effective causation from the various metaphysical sources described in religious utterances. In addition,
Western epistemologies (such as the neo-Kantianism prevalent in modern academia) may not be the last arbiters in the assessment of religious knowledge claims, and in particular of those emerging from long-term contemplative practice. 18 As King (1999) states:
My point is not that Western scholars should necessarily accept the emic this is the most plausible explanation for the well-documented transcultural access to apparently 'given' spiritual motives and realities (e.g., Grof, 1985 Grof, , 1988 Grof, , 1998 Shanon, 2002) . The other alternative is to appeal to Jung's notions of the collective unconscious and universal archetypes, but as Shanon (2002) explains, Jungian explanations fall short. On the one hand, many psychedelic visions are very different from those connected with the Jungian archetypes (e.g., the Hero, the Trickster, the Great Mother); on the other hand, many visions are culture-specific and 17 In his acclaimed work, The Empirical Stance (2002), the philosopher of science van Fraassen offers the most cogent and, in my opinion, definitive exposition of the ideological nature of associating scientific empiricism with naturalistic and materialistic metaphysical theories. 18 For critical discussions of neo-Kantianism in transpersonal and religious studies, see Ferrer (2000b Ferrer ( , 2002 and Ferrer and Sherman (2008b) , and for an often overlooked but important analysis of the 'radically subjectivist neoKantianism' (Nagy, 1991, p.365 ) that shaped Jung's metaphysical agnosticism, see Nagy (1991) . See also Kelly (1993, pp.22-26) for a proposed dissolution of the Kantianism affecting Jungian's view of the archetypes.
do not have the universal status of the archetypes, which Jung posited as 'associated with the common heritage that is shared by all human beings and which may well have evolved throughout the history of the species' (Ibid. p.391). After a lucid discussion of biological, depth psychological, cognitive, and supernatural interpretations of the related phenomenon of crosscultural commonalities in ayahuasca visions, Shanon rejects supernatural accounts and leans toward cognitive considerations (Ibid. pp.361-392). His final conclusion, however, is highly attuned to the participatory view of spiritual cocreation:
The cross-personal commonalities exhibited in Ayahuasca visions, the wondrous scenarios revealed by them, and the insights gained through them are perhaps neither just psychological, nor just reflective of other realms, nor are they 'merely' a creation of the human mind. Rather, they might be psychological and creative and real. (Ibid.
p.401)
The most remarkable feature of the transcultural access to spiritual phenomena is that human beings can enact and understand spiritual insights and cosmologies belonging to specific religious worlds even without previous exposure to them. In Grof's (1988) words:
In nonordinary states of consciousness, visions of various universal symbols can play a significant role in experiences of individuals who previously had no interest in mysticism or were strongly opposed to anything esoteric. These visions tend to convey instant intuitive understanding of the various levels of meaning of these symbols.
As a result of experiences of this kind, subjects can develop accurate understanding of various complex esoteric teachings. In some instances, persons unfamiliar with the 
Post-metaphysical versus participatory spirituality
In his recent work, Wilber (2006) Before explaining why Wilber's post-metaphysics may be reductionist, let me distinguish between two related but independent meanings of the term metaphysics. On the one hand, the notion of metaphysics in Western philosophy is generally based on the distinction between appearance and reality, with a metaphysical statement being one claiming to portray that 'Reality' presumably lying behind the realm of appearances (van Inwagen, 1998, p.12ff) . In addition to this use, on the other hand, many religious traditions also use 'metaphysical worlds' to refer to levels or dimensions of reality existing beyond the sensible world or within the subtle ontological depths of human consciousness. The first usage is the main target of Derrida's (1976) attack on the metaphysics of presence. On a strong reading, this critique leads to the a priori denial of the ontological status of any transcendent or metaphysical reality; the weaker reading simply requires a declaration of metaphysical agnosticism.
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Several years before Wilber articulated his integral post-metaphysics, the participatory approach eschewed the dualism of appearance and reality, as well as endorsed modern and postmodern critiques of traditional metaphysics of presence (Ferrer, 2002) . In contrast to Wilber, with our own and potentially housing spiritual worlds and indwelling nonphysical entities. 21 As anyone who has engaged systematically in entheogenic inquiry knows, for example, subtle realities and ostensibly autonomous spiritual entities can be encountered not only within one's Esbjörn-Hargens, 2010) . As I believe Wilber himself would admit, his particular genius manifests not in invention, but in the integration of others' ideas. 20 For two recent anthologies exploring the implications of post-metaphysical thought for religious studies, see Wrathall (2003) and Bloechl (2003) . Early discussions appeared in Ruf (1989 (Shanon, 2002) -and these external visions can sometimes be intersubjectively shared (Ferrer, in preparation-b) . Wilber's approach has three important shortcomings. First, it reduces the rich diversity of spiritual soteriologies and goals (deification, kaivalyam, devekut, nirvana, fana, visionary service, unio mystica, etc.) to a rather peculiar hybrid of Buddhist emptiness and Advaita/Zen nondual embrace of the phenomenal world. I critique this reductionism elsewhere (Ferrer, 2000b (Ferrer, , 2002 ) so I will not press the issue again here, but readers can consult the works by Heim (1995) , Hollenback (1996) , and Kaplan (2002) Second, serious questions can be raised about Wilber's claim that the Buddha achieved complete freedom. In contrast to later articulations of emptiness (sunyata), the Buddha's nirvana is described in the Buddhist canon as an utterly disembodied state of blissful consciousness in which all personality factors -including sensations, desires, feelings, and thoughts -have been totally extinguished (Harvey, 1995) . This should not come as a surprise: Most traditions spawned in India regarded embodied life as illusory or a source of suffering, thus seeking liberation in its transcendence. The dominant view in the Indian tradition is to consider spiritual freedom (moksa, mukti) as the release from the cycle of transmigratory experience (samsara), the body as bound and even created by karma and ignorance, and bodiless liberation (at death) as superior to living embodied liberation (Ford, 1998) . Immersed in this cultural-religious matrix, the Buddha also believed that the body and sexuality (and aspects of the heart, such as certain passions) were hindrances to spiritual flourishing (Faure, 1998) , and early Buddhism pictured the body as a repulsive source of suffering, nirvana as extinction of bodily senses and desires, and 'final nirvana' (parinirvana) as attainable only after death (Collins, 1998) . Though some exceptions may be found, this trend generally led the various Buddhist schools and vehicles to the repression, regulation, and/or transmutation of body and sexuality at the service of the 'higher' goal of the liberation of consciousness.
So, was the historical Buddha entirely 'Free,' as Wilber believes? My answer: Only if you understand spiritual freedom in the disembodied, and arguably dissociative, way pursued by early Buddhism. 25 Despite his downplaying the spiritual import of sexuality and the vital world, Sri Aurobindo (2001) was correct when he pointed out that a liberation of consciousness in consciousness should not be confused with an integral transformation that entails the spiritual Buddhism, implicitly situating all other spiritual choices as lower -a view that he believes all other Buddhists and religious people will eventually accept (D'Costa, 2000) . 25 I mean no disrespect or condescension. When looking at our religious past, it is important to avoid falling into what Owen Barfield called a 'chronological snobbery' that excoriates past spiritualities as deficient when considered from the perspective of our present standards (cited in Lewis, 1966, p.125) . My point is that many, though by no means all, past disembodied spiritual trends may have been appropriate and even inevitable in their particular historical and cultural contexts.
alignment of all human dimensions (pp.942ff). With this in mind, I have proposed an integral bodhisattva vow in which the conscious mind renounces full liberation until the body, the heart, and the primary world can be free as well from the alienating tendencies that prevent them from sharing freely in the unfolding life of the mystery here on earth (Ferrer, 2008b (Ferrer, , 2011 . Since the conscious mind is the seat of most individuals' sense of identity, an exclusive liberation of consciousness can be extremely deceptive insofar as one can believe that one is fully free when, in fact, essential dimensions of the self are underdeveloped, alienated, or in bondage -as the numerous sexual, emotional, and relational difficulties of traditionally 'enlightened' teachers attest (Feuerstein, 2006; Forsthoefel & Humes, 2005; Kripal, 1999; Storr, 1996) .
Third, despite Wilber's (1995) plea for the integration of ascending and descending spiritual trends, his account of spiritual freedom in terms of Buddhist emptiness reveals an ascending and 'monopolar' bias. Since the ascending bias has been already discussed (Daniels, M., 2005 (Daniels, M., , 2009 ), I focus here on the monopolar charge. As Heron (1998 Heron ( , 2006 explains, in addition to spiritualities that blatantly devalue body and world, monopolar spirituality is a more subtle type of disembodied orientation that sees spiritual life as emerging from the interaction of our immediate present experience with the structures or levels of transcendent consciousness (cf. Ferrer, 2008b; Ferrer, Albareda, & Romero, 2004; Romero & Albareda, 2001) . 26 The shortcoming of this monopolar understanding is that it ignores the existence of a second spiritual pole -immanent spiritual life or energy -that is intimately connected to the vital world and arguably stores the most generative power of the mystery (Ferrer, 2003; Ferrer & Sherman, 2008b ). Wilber's account is monopolar insofar as it conceives enlightenment in terms of a realization in consciousness that overlooks the crucial role of immanent life for genuinely integral spiritual growth and creative spiritual breakthroughs.
Wilber's proposed logic of 'transcend and include' as the formula of spiritual development gives the game away. When the mind emerges, it is said to transcend and include the body, vital energy, and emotions; when the witness consciousness emerges, it is said to transcend and include the mind; when higher structures of consciousness emerge, they are said to transcend and include the witness; and so forth. 27 Wilber regards the body and sexuality as sacred in the sense of having spiritual 'ground value' (i.e., they are expressions of absolute Spirit, emptiness, or God) and in that they can be sacralized in the nondual integral embrace; however, this account is very different from recognizing the centrality of intrinsically spiritual, immanent sources for holistic transpersonal development. When both consciousness and energy (and matter) are understood as equally fundamental spiritual players, integral spiritual development unfolds in a dialectical interaction with both transcendent and immanent spiritual sources that the logic of 'transcend and include' fails to capture (see Ferrer, 2003; Ferrer, Albareda, & Romero, 2004; Heron, 1998 Heron, , 2006 . A fully embodied spirituality, I suggest, emerges from the creative interplay of both immanent and transcendent spiritual energies in individuals who embrace the fullness of human experience while remaining firmly grounded in body and earth (Ferrer, 2008b you meditate, you are in effect witnessing the mind, thus turning subject into object -which is exactly the core mechanism of development. (Wilber, 2006, p.198) As Daniels (2009) indicates, however, meditation is, at least historically, an ascending spiritual practice. 28 Further, remember that the particular meditative techniques favored by 27 As Kelly (1998) and Washburn (1998) point out, however, Wilber's holarchical logic cannot account for important aspects of human development. 28 It is noteworthy that meditation and other contemplative practices are being re-envisioned today from the perspective of more holistic understandings; see for example, Ray's (2008) embodied reconstruction of Buddhist meditation, Rothberg's (2006 Rothberg's ( , 2008 relational and socially engaged expansion of Buddhist practice, Whicher's Wilber originated in religious systems seeking to liberate human beings from the suffering and/or illusory nature of both body and world through identification with the Self, the achievement of nirvana, and so forth. It may be countered that all contemplative traditions privilege one or another type of ascending meditation practice, to which I would respond that this is likely to be so because most past religious traditions were strongly patriarchal and leaned toward disembodiment and dissociation -see Ferrer (2008b) for documentation of this claim.
Consistent with his spiritual rankings, Wilber's enthroning of meditation as the spiritual practice par excellence privileges contemplative traditions over alternative visionary, wisdom, devotional, and socially engaged ones. In his concluding comment, Fontana gets to the heart of the matter when, in light of the four yogas of Hinduism -karma (yoga of action), bhakti (yoga of devotion), jnana (yoga of wisdom), and raja (yoga of meditation) -he suggests that meditation may be the path only for raja yogis (Rowan, et al., 2009, pp.58-59) . Buddhist meditation training has obvious limitations in fostering a truly integral spiritual development. This is evident, for example, in the control of body posture and potential repression of somatic intelligence (cf. Ray, 2008) , the strict regulation of sexual behavior and prohibition of the creative exploration of sensual desire (Faure, 1998; Loy, 2008) , the individualist focus and lack of relational and collective practices (Rothberg, 2008) , the aversion (1999) integrative account of Patanjali's yoga, and Schroeder's (1994) and Vennard's (1998) engagements of the body and sexuality in Christian prayer.
toward the expression of strong emotions such as anger (Masters, 2000) , and the overall lack of discrimination between attachment and passions. believe, is to create spaces in which these human dimensions can mature according to their own developmental principles and dynamics, not according to the ones the mind considers most adequate (see Ferrer, 2003; Ferrer, Romero, & Albareda, 2005; Romero & Albareda, 2001) .
A last point about Wilber's view of meditation: As the above reflects, I wholeheartedly agree with Fontana that meditation may not be the most effective or appropriate spiritual practice for everybody (for some it can be even counter-indicated; see Treleaven, 2010) . I want to add here that to elevate one's own spiritual choice as the universally superior one is a symptom of what I have called spiritual narcissism, which is unfortunately pandemic in the human approach to religious diversity (Ferrer, 2010 (Ferrer, , 2011 To conclude, from a participatory perspective, Wilber's nondual realization can be seen as one among many other spiritual enactions -one that it is not entirely holistic from any contemporary perspective recognizing the equal spiritual import of both consciousness and energy, both transcendent and immanent spiritual sources. I suggest that the cultivation of spiritual individuation -possibly regulated by something like the integral bodhisattva vow to minimize the pitfalls of past spiritualities -may be more effective than traditional paths to enlightenment in promoting not only the fully harmonious development of the person but also holistic spiritual realizations. This may be so because most traditional contemplative paths cultivate a disembodied, and potentially dissociative, spirituality even while providing access to such spiritual heights as classical mystical visions, ecstatic unions, and absorptions. Reasonably, one might ask whether the path of spiritual individuation may render such spiritual heights less likely -perhaps -but I wonder aloud whether our current individual, relational, social, and ecological predicament calls us to sacrifice some 'height' for 'breadth' (and arguably 'depth').
Put bluntly, in general it may be preferable today to shift our focus from those spiritual heights in order to 'horizontalize,' or pursue spiritual depths in the nitty-gritty of our embodied existence.
Even if slowly and making mistakes, I personally choose to walk toward such uncharted integral horizons rather than the 'road more traveled' of disembodied spirituality.
Conclusion
29 My emphasis on spiritual individuation should not be confused with what Bellah (1985) called 'Sheilaism' -named after Sheila, a respondent who claimed to have her own private religion. By contrast, my sense is the perspectives of spiritually individuated persons may naturally align with one another and shape spiritual networks and communities even across doctrinal differences -a communion or genuine unity-in-diversity of multiple spiritual perceptions.
In closing, three directions may be particularly productive in moving this dialogue forward.
First, it may be important for Wilber to unpack more explicitly the ontological implications of his integral post-metaphysics. In particular, I wonder whether he truly means to relegate spiritual realities to the individual's interiors, or whether this is an unintended upshot of his seeking to avoid the pitfalls of classical metaphysical systems. In addition, it is not clear whether he believes that all spiritual realities and entities are human cocreations or whether he is leaving room for the possibility that some may (co-)exist autonomously.
Second, I issue a plea to the transpersonal community to scrutinize the neo-Kantian assumptions lying beneath agnosticism toward the extra-physical and extra-psychological ontological status of spiritual realities. I believe it is fundamental to be aware that such a stance, far from warranting neutrality or impartiality, is the fruit of a modern, Western, and dualistic epistemological ethos that automatically renders suspect mystical claims about the nature of knowledge and reality. In their noble attempts to promote the scientific legitimacy of the field, some transpersonal psychologists -from Washburn (1995) to Friedman (2002) to Daniels, M. (2001 Daniels, M. ( , 2005 -may have prematurely committed to a neo-Kantian dualistic epistemology that is in fact ideologically tied to a naturalistic, and often materialistic, metaphysics. Whether such a naturalistic worldview will ultimately be cogent is unknown, but transpersonal scholars should be able recognize and make explicit the metaphysical presuppositions implicit in such methodological agnosticism; in this way, we can avoid assuming or defending its purportedly scientific, metaphysically neutral status and thereby falling prey to one of science's most prevalent ideologies (see van Fraassen, 2002) .
Finally, I firmly believe that both the scholarly credibility and future relevance of transpersonal psychology will be enhanced by a more thorough discernment of the merits and shortcomings of our past spiritual endeavors, a discontinuation of the common transpersonal practice of mystifying the mystics, and the undertaking of a critical exploration of the types of spiritual understandings and practices that may be most appropriate for our contemporary global situation. 
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